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Objectives: Despite the recognition of the importance of evidence-informed health policy and practice, there are still
barriers to translating research findings into policy and practice. The present study aimed to establish the feasibility of a
rapid response mechanism, a knowledge translation strategy designed to meet policymakers’ urgent needs for evidence
about health systems in a low income country, Uganda. Rapid response mechanisms aim to address the barriers of
timeliness and relevance of evidence at the time it is needed.
Methods: A rapid response mechanism (service) designed a priori was offered to policymakers in the health sector in
Uganda. In the form of a case study, data were collected about the profile of users of the service, the kinds of requests
for evidence, changes in answers, and courses of action influenced by the mechanism and their satisfaction with
responses and the mechanism in general.
Results: We found that in the first 28 months, the service received 65 requests for evidence from 30 policymakers and
stakeholders, the majority of whom were from the Ministry of Health. The most common requests for evidence were
about governance and organization of health systems. It was noted that regular contact between the policymakers and
the researchers at the response service was an important factor in response to, and uptake of the service. The service
seemed to increase confidence for policymakers involved in the policymaking process.
Conclusion: Rapid response mechanisms designed to meet policymakers’ urgent needs for research evidence about
health systems are feasible and acceptable to policymakers in low income countries.
Keywords: Knowledge translation, Evidence-informed policy, Health systems research, Health policy, Barriers for
evidence-based policies, Rapid response mechanisms, Uganda, Low and middle income countriesBackground
A large amount of health research done globally to help
improve lives and strengthen health systems results in
about one million publications annually and another equal
amount of unpublished work [1-3]. However, many of the
findings from this research are not used optimally, and
this represents missed opportunities for improved patient
care and management, resource allocation and strength-
ened health systems. These missed opportunities and the* Correspondence: mijumbi@yahoo.com
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unless otherwise stated.need to correct them and their consequences have been
recognized. While meeting in Mexico a decade ago and in
Bamako four years later, health ministers from United Na-
tions member states noted that if existing interventions
were adequately adopted, health systems would be stronger
and better positioned to deal with current global health
challenges [4]. They noted that research had a crucial but
under-recognized role in strengthening health systems, and
improving the equitable distribution of services. They
called for member states to promote knowledge translation
(KT) and exchange through evidence-informed policies
and policy-informed research, among other things [5].l Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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ent in improving healthcare delivery, and therefore health
system outcomes, and in reducing the waste of resources
[6,7]. Evidence may be used to inform background discus-
sions about the subject at hand; it may aid the definition
of the problem, identify the different policy or practice op-
tions to consider, or inform implementation strategies in
terms of barriers and facilitators [8]. It may also help iden-
tify new subjects for the policy agenda and evaluate the
impacts of policies too [9].
Both researchers and policymakers acknowledge the im-
portance of evidence-informed policy or decision making
and practice [10,11]. However they have quickly learned
that research results rarely passively get adopted into pol-
icy and practice [12,13], resulting in a persistent ‘know-do’
gap – the difference between what we know from research
and other sources of evidence, and what we actually do in
practice or incorporate in our policies [14]. When health
systems fail to use evidence optimally, the result is ineffi-
cient use of the available resources and subsequently a re-
duction in both quantity and quality of healthcare and
health outcomes [9,15]. In fact, the inability for health sys-
tems in many low and middle income countries to
effectively use evidence to inform their decisions and in-
terventions is cited as a major obstacle to the achievement
of the Millennium Development Goals [16,17].
Efforts to promote the uptake of research evidence in
policy making are the subject of several KT strategies,
which aim to systematically and transparently provide
access to, appraise and contextualize evidence as an in-
put into the policymaking process [18]. Such efforts have
been intensified globally including in low and middle
income countries. In the African, Asian, and Latin
American regions, several KT platforms, including EVIP-
Net and partners, are developing and evaluating KT strat-
egies. The Ugandan country node of the Regional East
African Community Health policy initiative (REACH-PI)
based at Makerere University is one of these EVIPNet
partners, who in collaboration with the Supporting Use of
Research Evidence (SURE) project, is carrying out research
on different KT strategies [19]. Others include the KT
Network Africa [20], the Cochrane collaboration [21], Evi-
dence for Health Policy in Vietnam (VINE) [22], the
African Institute for Development Policy (AFIDEP) [23],
Malawi’s Knowledge Translation Platform, KTPMalawi
[24], and the Evidence to Policy (E2P) in Argentina,
Bangladesh and Nigeria [25].
These platforms have contributed to the evolving un-
derstanding of factors that affect the ‘know-do’ gap. Sev-
eral factors have been consistently cited as affecting the
uptake of evidence during decision making processes;
personal contact between researchers and decision
makers, timely relevance of the research evidence in line
with the decision making process, and summaries withpolicy recommendations were common facilitators of
KT [26-28]. Other factors affecting the process included
mutual trust (in this case mistrust) between research
producers and policymakers, and decision makers’
power and budgetary factors. Another significant factor
is that policy and decision making happen at several dif-
ferent levels of governance. It has been noted that evi-
dence may be used more at higher levels than lower
ones [29]. Kasonde and Campbell [30] emphasize how
knowledge translation is context specific. Decisions are
made under different contexts, and one of these is time.
Although policy is rarely made in a short period, policy
decisions and positions are in fact often made rapidly –
often within hours or days [31]. There may also arise ur-
gent situations – say out of parliament, the media, and
from real or perceived crises – in which a decision needs
to be made in a short time. For a policymaker in this
situation, the timeliness and relevance of research evi-
dence if it is to be used to support the process would be
a major facilitating or hindering factor. A framework de-
veloped to assess country-level efforts to link research to
action identifies rapid response units (units aimed at
meeting policymakers’ urgent needs for research evidence)
as a strategy to aid ‘user-pull’ efforts of knowledge transla-
tion [32]. ‘User-pull’ efforts, it points out, are suited to sit-
uations in which the policymaker has identified a gap and
seeks to address it in a timely manner.
We report here on the feasibility of one such rapid re-
sponse mechanism in a low income country (Uganda),
aimed at meeting policymakers’ urgent needs for re-
search evidence about health systems. At the time of this
research, we were not aware of any other such mecha-
nisms in a low income country. We were also aware of
the fact that a survey of KT stakeholders in several low
and middle income countries (LMICs) had suggested
that such rapid response units would not be feasible or
necessary in these settings [33].
The rapid response service
Prior to this study, we developed a structure of a service
to receive and respond to urgent requests for research evi-
dence about health systems from policy and decision
makers. We imagined that such a service would benefit
mid to top level policy and decision makers at ministries
of health, districts or local governments, Civil Society Or-
ganizations, health-related multi-, and bi-lateral agencies,
the private sector, and legislators such as parliamentarians,
among others. Such decision makers would not only have
to be involved in making urgent policy decisions regularly,
but they would also have to recognize and value research
as an input in the policymaking process.
The service, although acknowledging the importance
of all other elements of healthcare, especially clinical
practice, defined its scope to include themes of health
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and financial arrangements. The researchers had noted
that although there still exist a number of challenges in ac-
tual completion, there has been a longer period of experi-
ence with evidence-based medicine as compared to its
policy counterpart, driven especially by the nursing pro-
fession [34].
Figure 1 summarizes the steps that we took to develop
the structure. This involved a) reviewing the literature
around such mechanisms as that proposed; b) brain-
storming what the literature revealed; and c) then using
this information to design a rapid response service. This
design was presented to potential users through con-
sultative interviews and their feedback used to modify it
before piloting it.
The development process continued throughout the
pilot period with activities that included provision of office
space, recruitment of KT practitioners, the provision of
easy internet access with subscription to relevant research
databases, building networks with researchers, KT practi-
tioners and policymakers (many of whom contributed to
review processes), sensitization activities for policymakers,
development of standard operating procedures outlining,
among other things, the steps for producing a rapid re-
sponse evidence brief, etc.Figure 1 Development of the REACH-PI rapid response service.The service was structured as follows: The service was
based at Makerere University, the oldest and largest uni-
versity in Uganda located in Kampala, the capital of the
country. The service was coordinated by hired staff that
kept in regular contact with policymakers and health
systems’ stakeholders. They were supported by a wide
network of researchers in and outside the region. The
staff would receive questions from the policymakers by
telephone, email or physical contact. They would then
take the policymaker through a process of question clari-
fication to ensure that the question was not only clear
and asked in an answerable manner, but that it indeed
fell within the scope handled by the service. Requests
were rejected when they did not fall into the scope of
the service in terms of topic or theme or urgency (where
information was needed in more than 28 days). In search
cases, the policymakers were politely directed to a
source that the researchers felt would best handle the
question. Following this, they searched for research evi-
dence relevant to this query, appraised it, contextualized
and summarized it. This summary would then be
reviewed by local and international experts on the given
subject. Such experts were identified through several
processes – they could be authors from the literature
reviewed, or experts identified by senior researchers on
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the WHO. Once the review process was complete, the
staff prepared a short brief of usually four pages max-
imum, with clear key messages that would be submitted
to the policymaker. (Where the available time was short,
for example, with responses required in less than five
days, an internal review was done by a senior researcher
on the service. The brief would still be sent to an exter-
nal reviewer and the policymaker informed that if the re-
viewer’s input was substantially different from the brief
delivered to him/her, an updated version would be pro-
vided as soon as possible). The above process would take
any time less than 28 days. The service began with its
scope limited to health systems questions concerning
organizational arrangements, governance arrangements,
strategies for implementing change, and financial ar-
rangements. After the first six months, the scope was
widened to include health technology assessments.
Methods
Design
Using a case study design, as guided by Yin [35], we
studied the feasibility of such a mechanism as described
above, to meet the urgent needs of policymakers for evi-
dence about health systems. This was initially piloted
with a few (12) policymakers for 8 months between
March and October 2010, and was later run in a larger
phase, open to all potential users, after January 2011.
We report here on the findings between March 2010
and July 2012 (28 months).
Population and setting
We offered the service to policymakers and stakeholders
(including technical support staff, health managers, ad-
vocacy personnel, development partners) with varied
backgrounds, endeavoring to include a wide range of po-
tential users of such a service. These were from the Min-
istry of Health, Districts, Civil Society Organizations,
health-related multi-, and bi-lateral agencies and the pri-
vate sector. We involved mid and top level policy or de-
cision makers, and their staffers.
During the first six months (pilot phase), we included
a convenience sample of users policymakers who under-
stood the principles of KT and this particular strategy of
the rapid response service, starting with 3 participants
and gradually increasing the number to 12. The service
was later opened up to all policymakers and stakeholders
in the health sector, with no sampling from the side of
the researchers.
Data collection
We collected data using questionnaires (questionnaires
and other resources used on the service and for the study
are attached as an Additional file 1 and can also be foundin the REACH-PI [U] clearing house [36]); researchers on
the team filled in responses to questions posed to the
users on their particulars and those of the organizations
with which they were affiliated. In addition, we collected
data on how the service was used, and the immediate and
delayed (after one month) experiences of the users follow-
ing receipt of the rapid response evidence briefs. This was
done every time there was a request for evidence. We also
used key informant interviews guided by interview guides,
for a purposive sample of policymakers (10) to better
understand the process and their experience.
Data analysis
We summarized the quantitative data using frequencies,
proportions, and bar charts. In addition, we summarized
the responses to the semi-structured questions, coding
these and drawing common themes from them.
Ethical issues
We received approval for this work from the School of
Medicine Research and Ethics Committee of the College
of Health Sciences, Makerere University. We also sought
informed oral consent from each of the participants be-
fore they participated in the study. Participants’ iden-
tities are kept confidential on the rapid response briefs.
However, their information and particulars were left
open to the research team to enable follow-up and in-
depth contextual understanding of the process. Partici-
pants were informed about this.
Results
The service was piloted between March and August
2010, and the open phase was taken on thereafter. Re-
sults included in this paper are from the first 28 months
of the service, that is, March 2010 to June 2012. During
this time, several staff worked on the service in both full
time and part time capacity. Staff included researchers
with a background in medical or social/population stud-
ies, coupled with research methods skills. In addition,
they either had to have or get equipped with writing and
policy analysis skills, and a general understanding of the
health system and policy formulation process.
Response to service
During the pilot phase, the service was offered purposively
to 12 policy makers; of these 10 (83.3%) responded with
the intention of using it if the opportunity arose. A total of
9 out of the 10 intending to use the service actually used it.
During the open phase, the service was open to all
policymakers and stakeholders requiring health systems’
evidence urgently. In total, 30 policymakers and stake-
holders made use of the service. Table 1 shows the kinds
of policymakers that used the service during the said
time, while Table 2 shows the types of organizations with
Table 1 Users of the rapid response service
Type of policymakers Number of
policymakers
Senior policymaker in Ministry of Health 10
Mid-level policymaker in Ministry of Health 13
Decision maker in Non-Governmental Organization 5
Support staff to Ministry of Health 2
Total 30
Table 3 Topics or areas for research evidence needs
posed to the rapid response service
Type of question Frequency
Governance 17
Organization 13
Health technology assessments 11
Implementation strategies 11
Financial arrangements 9
Other (E.g. Public health) 4
Total 65
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were from or attached to the Ministry of Health. Amongst
these were those not working at the ministry but support-
ing the ministry, for example, as part of a technical work-
ing group. The majority, that is, 13 out of 23, identified
themselves as mid-level policymakers at the Ministry of
Health (MoH). Notably, no decision makers or stake-
holders at the district level made use of the service during
this time period.
These 30 policy makers and stakeholders generated 65
questions that were within the scope of the service (a list
of the users and that of their questions can be found in
the REACH-PI [U] clearing house [36]). One senior pol-
icymaker asked 7 questions, while a decision maker in a
non-governmental organization asked 8 questions. The
majority asked one or two questions each during this
study period. There are also six instances in which a
question was asked by more than one party, either separ-
ately or in a referral-style (one question asked by several
persons in a sequential manner). One such instance in-
cluded a question asked by a mid-level policymaker but
following from the president of the republic of Uganda
through a chain of referral of senior policymakers.
The topics or areas according to the scope are as
shown in Table 3. The most prevalent (17/65) of the
questions were about governance issues in the health
system, followed by those about organizational arrange-
ments (14 out of 65). Four questions in the group ‘other’
included those on public health topics. Such questions
did not fall in one of the categories that was identified asTable 2 Organization of affiliation of rapid response
service users
Organization of affiliation of policymakers Number of
policymakers
Ministry of Health 23
Bi/Multi-lateral Organizations 4
Government (Not Ministry of/health) 2
Non-Governmental Organizations 1
Districts 0
Total 30within the scope of the service at the time but were an-
swered to allow the service test its capacity.
The average duration in which answers were needed was
13 (12.8) days. While the modal time for response was
21 days, two questions required responses in 24 and
48 hours each and another six questions required response
in 5 days. The maximum time that was given for a request
was 28 days. Of the 65 questions, 81.5% (53 out of 65) re-
sponses were returned on time, 10.8% (7 out of 65) were
returned later than the allotted time, and the 7.7%
(5 out of 65) were not followed through to the end. Some
of the reasons given for responses returned late were late
reviews and deliveries through a third party, for example, a
secretary. For those not followed through to the end, one
of the reasons noted was that the policymakers were not
available to clarify the question. This happened when the
question was asked on behalf of another party, and the
clarification was referred to the original policymaker. The
fact that they were not available to ask the question them-
selves might mean that their availability to clarify it was
also low.
Figure 2 is a histogram showing the frequency with
which the questions were received over the study period.
It is noted that there were periods in which there were
sudden spurts in the number of questions. These periods
represented times following active sensitization of policy-
makers about the service. There was active sensitization in
February 2011 and January 2012, as marked by the solid
arrows. Furthermore, there were more questions coming
in the later part of the first half of the year. These times
are marked out on the histogram with broken arrows.
A total of 11 of the questions were solicited for by the
staff of the rapid response service. That is, the re-
searchers prompted the policymakers to ask questions
that they felt required evidence. All of the 11 were dur-
ing the pilot phase; all questions after the pilot were un-
solicited, that is, they were initiated by the policymakers.
The needs for which questions were asked varied. The
commonest reason was to contribute to meetings and de-
bates with peers, superiors, and development partners.










































































































































Figure 2 Histogram showing the frequency of receipt of questions by the rapid response service.
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proposals and concepts to management or development
partners.
Experience of users of the service
Before using the service
Through mechanisms provided for users to give feed-
back following receipt of a rapid response brief, users
were able to give their experience of the briefs they re-
ceived and the service in general. We compared this ex-
perience with that before the service. Before preparation
of a brief, we asked the policymaker what they thought
the answer to their question was and how confident they
were about it. We also asked them what they would do
without the rapid response brief and how confident they
were in that course of action. Tables 4 and Table 5 show
the confidence in answers and courses of action on a
given decision before using the rapid response service.
For 7 out of 65 (10.7%) questions, the policymaker wasTable 4 Table showing confidence in respondents’ own
answers at the time of asking rapid response service
help
Confidence in answers before rapid response Frequency Percent
Very confident 1 1.5
Confident 6 9.2
Neither confident nor ‘unconfident’ 30 46.2
‘Unconfident’ 19 29.2
Very ‘unconfident’ 3 4.6
No idea 3 4.6
No response 3 4.6
Total 65 100.0either confident or very confident of their answer before
the brief and for 30 out of 65 (46.2%), they were neither
confident nor ‘unconfident’ in their own answers. For 3
out of 65 (4.6%) questions, policymakers had felt they
had no idea what the answer to their question was be-
fore approaching the RRS.
With or without an answer to their question at the
time of requesting the rapid response service for help,
policymakers would have to chart a course of action at
some point. For only 12 out of 65 (18.4%) of questions
were policymakers confident or very confident about
their next steps of action. On two occasions, the policy-
makers reported they had no idea what their next steps
would be without the rapid response service’s help.
After using the service
Table 6 and Table 7 show the change in answers and
courses of action following receipt of the rapid response
briefs.Table 5 Table showing confidence in the respondents’
course of action on given decision before rapid response
service help
Confidence in course of action before rapid
response
Frequency Percent
Very confident 1 1.5
Confident 11 16.9
Neither confident nor ‘unconfident’ 26 40.0
‘Unconfident’ 18 27.7
Very ‘unconfident’ 5 7.7
No idea 2 3.1
No response 2 3.1
Total 65 100.0
Table 7 Table showing change in respondents’ course of
action following rapid response brief





No response 10 15.4
Total 65 100.0
Mijumbi et al. Implementation Science 2014, 9:114 Page 7 of 10
http://www.implementationscience.com/content/9/1/114Following the briefs for 43 out of 65 (66.2%) of ques-
tions, the policymakers reported that their answer to the
question had changed. For 28 out of 43 (65.1) questions
for which answers changed, the policymakers reported
feeling confident, while for 14 out of 43 (32.6%), they re-
ported feeling very confident about their new answers.
For 30 out of 65 (46.2%) of questions posed to the ser-
vice, the policymaker changed their course of action
with the new information, while 25/65 (38.5%) contin-
ued with their previous course of action. For 15 out of
30 (50.0%) questions for which the course of action
changed, the policymakers reported feeling confident,
while for 14 out of 30 (46.7%), they reported feeling very
confident about their new course of action.Satisfaction
Users of the service were also asked about satisfaction
with the answers that they had received and with the
service in general. In total, 42 (64.5%) were satisfied with
the answers they received, while 16 out of 65 (24.6%)
were very satisfied. In addition, for 29 out of 65 (44.6%)
questions, the policymaker reported being satisfied with
the service, while for 27 out of 65 (41.5%), they reported
being very satisfied. For 2 out of 65 (3.1%), policymakers
reported being unsatisfied with the service. On both oc-
casions they reported that the rapid response brief had
not been received within the agreed time.
For 7 out of 65 questions, there was loss-to-follow-up of
the policymakers and therefore no feedback acquired. Rea-
sons for loss-to-follow-up included policymakers leaving
their post for another in a different location with no for-
warding contact, or failing to reply to their known con-
tacts. In addition, there was no feedback sought for those
questions that were not followed through to the end.Attitudes
All policymakers involved agreed before and after use of
the service that research evidence was an important part
of the policymaking process. They however emphasized
that it was only a part of several others and also cau-
tioned that it was crucial that it not be ‘twisted’ to fit
one’s needs.Table 6 Table showing respondents’ change in answers
after using the rapid response brief
Change in answer after rapid response brief Frequency Percent
Yes 43 66.2
No 14 21.5
No response 8 12.3
Total 65 100.0Challenges
A new start-up like the rapid response service is not
without operational challenges. A major challenge we
found was getting the policymakers to use the service at
the start. Having had no experience with it, many poten-
tial users were skeptical. Another reason they reported
for their skepticism was the fact that this was being run
by researchers and they did not think that researchers
understood their needs. Others showed no interest at all,
possibly fuelled by the lack of awareness of the import-
ance of evidence in decision making [25,37]. We found
that policymakers invariably required time, patience, and
persistence in getting them interested in the service.
However, once this happened, several began to refer
their colleagues to it. It was also a challenge getting
personnel with the right mix of skills and qualifications
to work on the service, a challenge that has been previ-
ously reported in KT literature [9,25,30]. In addition, the
demand on personal time that the service required was
also a challenge for human resource. Other challenges
that may especially apply to a low income country in-
cluded fast and reliable internet connectivity, and access
to databases and full text research papers [12].
Discussion
Rapid response mechanisms to ease the barriers of time-
liness and relevance of health systems and policy evi-
dence for policymakers at the time they need it, are not
a common phenomenon, especially in low income coun-
tries. What is usually seen when there is need for such
evidence is specially convened task forces or think tanks
of consultants and experts to address the given situation
[38], or special committees and/or advisory bodies [39].
These are similar in a way to the rapid response service
described in this paper, although they tend to work more
in a reactive manner than proactively. Mechanisms that
provide evidence in a relevant and timely manner are
emerging in higher income settings and are increasingly
popular for both clinical and policy needs [40-42]. For
example, researchers on the Knowledge to Action (KTA)
research program reported that their efforts to address
knowledge users’ needs for timely and user-friendly evi-
dence in the Champlain region in Canada were highly
valued by researchers and knowledge users [41]. Dobbins
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KT interventions that actively deliver and adapt to the
needs of end users (ensuring the content of the message
is relevant, timely and applicable to the intended user),
rather than requiring them to access it independently,
may lead to changes in knowledge and practice [43,44].
Mechanisms working in a similar proactive manner
have been considered for LMICs. A study to assess the
level of interest in the establishment of a regional mech-
anism in Asia with the capacity to respond to questions
from policy makers was done by Healy and colleagues
[33]. They reported that such initiatives might not be
feasible in these settings due to a number of reasons, in-
cluding the fact that ‘the provision of information often
depends on external information providers who cannot
necessarily drop other commitments to give priority to a
request’. They also cited the fact that readily available
and specific information about health systems is in short
supply and, when found, it has to be contextualized to a
particular setting and system; and also the fact that evi-
dence for health system policymaking requires careful
and considered assessment, and planning within differ-
ent contexts and within highly political environments.
They noted that during such processes, clarifying what
has been asked and shaping its answer is an iterative
process, which would slow down the whole process.
They further noted that such mechanisms may not be
suited for health systems policy but for disaster planning
and infectious disease management.
The findings of our study suggest that in fact the Healy
paper findings more or less indicated a lack of experience
with such initiatives and that when the challenges it cites
are addressed, such a mechanism is feasible and accepted
by policymakers. There are case studies of government
support units or independent outside units that carry out
KT activities in a manner similar to that described in this
case study [8]. They are usually equipped with suitably
skilled staff and appropriate infrastructure and have been
known to assist in some of the barriers faced by policy-
makers in accessing and using research evidence for deci-
sions and policy.
In this study, it was notable that the service was widely
used by the ministry of health at the central headquar-
ters and stakeholders in bilateral and multi-lateral agen-
cies plus NGOs. There was notably no response from
the districts. This may be a reflection of who feels they
might benefit from such services, which would be mid-
level to top administration policymakers in a health sys-
tem who are generally involved in policymaking. In his
paper, Nick Black [29] observes that the relation between
research and policy depends on the arena and, therefore,
the policymakers. He notes that research evidence is
more influential in policymaking at the central level than
the local level, the former being more characterized bynegotiation and uncertainty than the latter. This would
therefore be a reflection of different needs at different
decision making levels and therefore the necessity to
tailor the rapid response services differently, relevantly
and suitably. However, the findings may also be because
of the proximity of the ministry and where the service in
this study was located, which promotes a closer relation-
ship between the two. The studies by Innvaer S et al.
[26] and Lavis et al. [28] noted that one facilitator of the
uptake of research evidence during policymaking is close
interaction between the two worlds. This interaction is
also reflected in the fact that following a period of close
interaction through sensitization activities, there was a
spike in queries coming to the service.
There obviously was a need for information across the
scope that was spelled out. There were, however, more
governance and organization questions than finance
questions. The fewer financial arrangement questions
may reflect the fact that for the topic, policymakers may
be looking to other areas for answers. For example, they
may be consulting experts such as economists and inter-
national reports and publications, for example from the
World Bank, and policymakers may rely on these more
than the literature or such a rapid response service [31].
The findings in our study suggest that policymakers
often knew what the answer to their question was but
were not confident about it without the evidence. Fur-
thermore, several had charted a course of action but
were again not confident. With the evidence briefs, it
was apparent that the confidence in their own answers
improved, and so did the confidence in the courses of
action. Campbell and colleagues note that policies and
decisions based on evidence are more likely to give pol-
icymakers confidence in the decisions that they make
[45]. In addition, although several had an idea as to what
the answer to their query was, a change in answers and
course of action reflects the fact that research evidence
introduced more options for them to consider. This is in
keeping with reflections from Strydom et al.’s paper,
which asserts that scientific evidence indeed exposes
policymaking to a wider range of validated concepts and
experiences. This fact enables decisions and policies to
be made based on a solid technical foundation and does
open up a range of policy options for policymakers to
consider and choose from [46].
In this study, policymakers echoed what several re-
searchers have found, that policymakers are indeed inter-
ested in using research evidence and do value what it
contributes to the policymaking process. Our findings also
suggest that they were accepting of the service and gener-
ally found it satisfying to their needs. Judith Healy and col-
leagues’ study found that policymakers and researchers
were generally supportive of establishments similar to the
rapid response service or some type of regional information
Mijumbi et al. Implementation Science 2014, 9:114 Page 9 of 10
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governance and other activities [33].
Implications for future research
Our study did not attempt to profile several of the fac-
tors that may have an effect on the service, its operations
and outcomes. Such factors may include the policy and
decision makers that such a service can reach; its poten-
tial stakeholders, for example, funders; the staff working
on it to tell what kind can make such a service work opti-
mally; the environments or contexts in which the policy-
makers work and in which the services are placed. These
are areas that future research may need to answer.
Future research may also consider work at the district
and other local government levels to better understand
what type of service is appropriate, considering that it is
at the district level that decisions are implemented.
Implications for policy
The findings from this research suggest a promising KT
strategy. However, questions and concerns arise about
the presence of capacity needed to run these services in
low income countries. For example, the absence of reli-
able and fast internet connections or access to databases
of research may hamper the optimal operations of such
a service, and its sustainability. Authorities considering
such a service would need to invest in the resources, in-
cluding human resources, to be able to gain from it.
Furthermore, for many that are donor-funded like the
service in this case study, there need to be plans for in-
stitutionalizing activities in order to ensure continuity
even after donor funds are terminated. The service pre-
sented here will be absorbed into the Uganda National
Health Research Organization at the end of the project
period to ensure its sustainability. How and where it is
institutionalized is important to ensure its continued im-
partiality and independence.
Conclusion
Policymakers are sometimes faced with a barrier of timely
and relevant research evidence when attempting to make
evidence-informed policies and decisions. This barrier
may further be amplified when decisions are to be taken
in a short time, say hours or days. This research suggests
that a rapid response mechanism is a feasible strategy to
meet these urgent needs for research evidence for policy
and decisions even in a low income country. Users of the
service would be mainly those at the central level. This re-
search suggests that the mechanism increases confidence
of policymakers involved in the policy making process,
and it provides them with more options for consideration
during deliberation. While registering their satisfaction
with using this service, policymakers emphasized the value
of using research evidence for decision making. A rapidresponse mechanism for urgent evidence needs is feasible
and acceptable to policymakers in low income countries.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Questionnaires and other resources used on the
rapid response service.
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